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STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a 
jury trial in the Third Circuit Court for Salt Lake City, 
the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans presiding, on the charges of 
improper satellite dish placement under the Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Section 51-5-7 jurisdiction 
for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2-3, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Is Salt Lake City preempted by federal law from 
regulating location of certain structures, including 
satellite dish antennas, in front yards? 
2. Are any of Palmer's other 149 issues grounds for 
reversal of the trial court? 
GOVERNING LAW 
Salt Lake City Ordinance: 
Sec, 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The 
area of a required front yard shall be open 
and unobstructed except for the following 
which are permitted: 
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar 
structures as provided elsewhere by this 
chapter. 
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main 
building; provided, however, that they are 
not more than four feet in height and do not 
cause any danger or hazard to traffic by 
obstructing the view of the street or 
intersection. Any portion of any steps, 
covered or uncovered, that are more than four 
feet above grade must be back of the required 
setback line. 
(3) Eaves or cornices projecting not more 
than two feet. 
(4) Driveway leading to a properly located 
garage or parking area; provided, however, no 
portion of a front yard as required in this 
ordinance, except for those approved 
driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled 
so as to encourage or make possible the 
parking of automobiles, nor shall the city 
allow any curb cuts or approve any driveways 
except for entrance and exit driveways 
leading to properly located parking areas. 
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in 
required front yard areas of single family 
dwellings leading to and from a properly 
located garage or carport on the property 
subject to the following conditions: 
(a) All such drives shall be of 
concrete construction. 
(b) Such drives shall not be over 
twelve (12) feet in width. 
(c) There shall be an area in 
landscaping at least fifteen (15) feet 
in depth from the front property line to 
the farthest edge of the drive. 
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used 
for the parking or storage of any 
trailer, boat or other equipment at any 
time, nor is the area to be used for 
overnight or permanent parking of any 
vehicle. 
(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked 
on driveways serving private residences, 
provided the automobile is parked 
completed on private property. 
Federal Communication Commission Regulation. 47 CFR 
Ch. (1 10-1-88 edition) §25.104. 
State and local zoning or other regulations 
that differentiate between satellite receive-
only antennas and other types of antenna 
facilities are preempted unless such 
regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined 
health, safety or aesthetic objective; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable 
limitations on, or prevent, reception of 
satellite delivered signals by receive-only 
antennas or to impose costs on the users of 
such antennas that are excessive in light of 
the purchase and installation cost of the 
equipment. 
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas 
is preempted in the same manner except that 
state and local health and safety regulation 
is not preempted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/appellant Bruce Palmer (Palmer) was charged 
by an Information with violating Section 51-5-7 Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City by unlawfully placing an 
unlawful structure, a satellite dish antenna, in his front 
yard. The facts when viewed in a light most favorable to 
upholding the jury verdict, are as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant Bruce Palmer ("Palmer") is the owner of 
the real property at 833 East Pennsylvania Avenue. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, (R. 50-51). 
2. Craig Spangenberg of the Salt Lake City Building 
and Housing Division received a complaint concerning 833 
East Pennsylvania Avenue (R. 37). At that location, he 
observed a satellite dish antenna located in the front yard 
(R. 38). Spangenberg advised the defendant that the 
satellite dish in the front yard was a violation of Salt 
Lake City ordinance on December 16, 1987. (R. 43). 
3. On December 17, 1987, Spangenberg issued Palmer a 
Notice and Order by certified mail (R. 43-44) notifying the 
defendant that he was in violation of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance No. 51-5-7 allowing only certain structures in the 
front yard and ordering Palmer to remove a satellite dish 
located in his front yard before January 4, 1988. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). 
4. A misdemeanor citation for violation of Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 51-5-7 was issued to Palmer on January 6, 
1988 (CR 1-2). 
5. Palmer was advised of his right to apply for a 
variance on December 31, 1988 (R. 45). Palmer did not apply 
for a variance (R. 47). At trial on July 5, 1989, the jury 
found the defendant had not complied with the notice and 
order (R. 52) and was guilty of violating §51-5-7, 
R.O.S.L.C. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Salt Lake CityTs regulation of front yard 
structures, including satellite receive only dish antennas, 
is not preempted by federal law because Salt Lakefs 
regulation does not differentiate between satellite receive 
only antennas and other types of antennas and the Salt Lake 
City ordinance has reasonable health, safety and aesthetic 
objectives that do not impose unreasonable limitations on 
satellite received signals. 
2. The balance of Palmer's 149 issues including the 
trial court lacking jurisdiction because judges are not 
compensated in gold or silver and defendant's fine not being 
valid because tender was in currency rather than gold or 
silver are without any substantial merit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SALT LAKE CITY'S REGULATION OF FRONT 
YARD STRUCTURES INCLUDING SATELLITE 
RECEIVE ONLY ANTENNAS IS NOT PREEMPTED 
BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The pivotal issue in this case is whether Salt Lake 
City Ordinance 51-5-7 regulating what structures are 
permissible on front yards is preempted by Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) regulation. 
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a 
federal law may preempt a state law where conflict exists 
between the federal and state law. U.S. Constitution 
Article VI, §2. Similarly federal regulations may preempt 
state and local laws. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 81 
L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). A federal regulation preempts local law 
if the federal agency has exercised complete authority in 
the area in question and if the agency is legally authorized 
to preempt local law. New York v. FCC, 100 L.Ed.2d 45, 57-
59 (1988). 
In this case the FCC has exercised its regulatory 
authority over satellite receive only dish antennas. The 
federal regulations, however, specifically allow local 
control under certain guidelines. Federal Regulation 47 CFR 
§25.104 states that all local laws inconsistent with its 
requirements are preempted. 
The FCC has adopted regulations dealing specifically 
with federal preemption of local zoning for satellite 
antennas, entitled, "Preemption of Local Zoning of Earth 
Stations." 47 CFR §25.104. This regulation establishes the 
following standards for preempting local law. 
State and local zoning or other regulations 
that differentiate between satellite receive-
only antennas and other types of antenna 
facilities are preempted unless such 
regulations: 
(a) Have a reasonable and clearly defined 
health, safety or aesthetic objective; and 
(b) Do not operate to impose unreasonable 
limitations on, or prevent, reception of 
satellite delivered signals by receive-only 
antennas or to impose costs on the users of 
such antennas that are excessive in light of 
the purchase and installation cost of the 
equipment. 
Regulation of satellite transmitting antennas 
is preempted in the same manner except that 
state and local health and safety regulation 
is not preempted. 
It is unclear whether the FCC in promulgating the 
preemption, has acted within the boundaries of its 
authority. In Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 
F.Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1988), defendants asserted that the FCC 
had exceeded its authority in preempting local regulations 
of satellite antenna. The court held that it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to consider this issue because, "before 
an FCC order is submitted to judicial review, the FCC must 
have been given the opportunity to reconsider its position 
Id. at 1029. However, for the purpose of this Brief, it is 
assumed that the FCC has legal authority to preempt local 
law. The fact that the FCC has not reconsidered its 
position on preemption in this case, or others, may perhaps 
defeat the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to 
consider this issue. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This regulation establishes an initial standard to 
determine if federal preemption occurs, i.e. the local 
zoning ordinance must differentiate between satellite 
receive only antennas and other types of antennas before 
federal preemption occurs. If a local ordinance 
differentiates between satellite receive only antenna and 
other types of antenna facilities federal preemption is 
still not automatic. The federal regulation then provides a 
two part balancing test. If the local restriction: (1) is 
reasonably related to health, safety or aesthetic 
objectives, and, (2) does not impose costly burdens and 
limitations on satellite users; it is not preempted by 
2 
federal law. 
The threshold question thus is whether the City 
ordinance "differentiates" between "satellite receive-only 
antenna" and "other types of antenna facilities." Palmer 
was convicted of violating Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 
which states, in part, "[T]he area of a required front yard 
shall be open and unobstructed except for the following 
which are permitted: 
Van Meter, supra, at 1029-1031; Breeling v. Churchill, 423 
N.W.2d 469, 471 (Neb. 1988); L.I.M.A. Partners v. Northvale, 
530 A.2d 839, 844 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987); Minars v. Rose, 
507 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (A.D.2d Dept. 1986); Ross v. Hatfield, 
640 F.Supp. 708, 712 (D.Kan. 1988). 
(1) A fence or wall . . . 
(2) Uncovered steps . . . 
(3) Eaves or cornices . . . 
(4) A driveway leading to a properly placed 
garage. . • . 
(5) Circular driveways . • ." 
Section 51-5-7 does not differentiate between types of 
antennas. It does not allow any type of antenna, whether 
satellite, UHF, VHF or radio antenna, to be placed in a 
front yard. This section simply lists five (5) permitted 
structures which can be placed in front yards. Since the 
City ordinance prohibits all types of antenna from being 
placed in front yards, it does not discriminate among the 
various types of antenna. Thus, the City's ordinance meets 
the FCC's first requirement and preemption is unwarranted. 
Even if the discrimination test was met, Salt Lake City 
Ordinance 51-5-7 would still survive the two part balancing 
test and there would be no federal preemption. The purpose 
of the ordinance is to diminish the unsightly visual impact 
of antenna by prohibiting placement in a front yard. The 
ordinance alleviates the concern with the surrounding 
property values which may be diminished by placing antenna 
in a front yard. Some safety concerns may also be achieved 
by preventing antenna placement in front yards to avoid the 
3 
hazards of a fallen or windblown antenna. 
The City ordinance must not prevent or impose 
unreasonable limitations on satellite reception; nor impose 
unreasonable costs. Here, the City ordinance does not 
completely prohibit the use of satellite antenna or other 
antenna facilities. The ordinance simply prevents front 
yard placement of all antennaes. Alternative placement 
sites are easily available and Salt Lake Code §51-5-6 
specifically allows for rear yard placement. Other 
placement alternatives, such as side yard or roof top 
placement may be sought. Furthermore, the City is not 
3 
Salt Lake City Code Section 51-1-2 provided: 
21.02.020 Purpose of Title 21 provisions. 
This title is designed and enacted for the purpose of 
promoting the health, safety, morals, convenience, 
order, prosperity and welfare of the present and future 
inhabitants of Salt Lake City, including among other 
things: 
A. The lessening of congestion in the streets or 
roads; 
B. Securing safety from fire and other dangers; 
C. Providing adequate light and air; 
D. Classification of land uses and distribution of 
land development and utilization; 
E. Protection of the tax base; 
F. Securing economy in governmental expenditures; and 
G. Fostering the city's industrial, business and 
residential development. (Prior code §51-1-2). 
insensitive to the unique needs and circumstances of 
individuals and properties. Should no other placement 
alternative be available, a satellite user may apply for a 
variance to place his satellite in a front yard location. 
The City ordinance neither imposes nor creates unreasonable 
costs upon the satellite user. Unlike other ordinances, the 
City ordinance does not impose costly screenings or barriers 
to be placed around a satellite antenna. 
In Van Meter, supra, the town of Maplewood passed an 
ordinance prohibiting the placement of satellite antenna in 
front yards and on roof tops. The ordinance required a 10 
foot height limitation and the satellite dish to be enclosed 
by a 6 foot wall of evergreen shrubbery to hide its 
visibility from adjoining property and from the streets. 
Plaintiff, after unsuccessfully applying for a variance, 
placed his satellite antenna on his roof. The Township of 
Maplewood commenced action to enforce the township 
ordinance. The court held that although the town ordinance 
had a legitimate health, safety and aesthetic object, it 
discriminated against satellite antenna users. The court 
held that the ordinance singled out satellite antennas over 
"other types of antenna facilities," and, in fact, excluded 
from the ordinances' coverage UHF, VHF and radio antennas 
similarly placed. The court further concluded that the 
screening requirements of evergreen shrubbery were too 
costly a burden placed on the satellite user. 
Unlike the Van Meter case Salt Lake City does not 
differentiate between antennas. It makes all types of 
antennas subject to the same requirement, they are not 
permitted structures in front yard areas and therefore 
federal preemption would not apply. Even if, arguendo, 
differentiation could be found the Salt Lake City Ordinance 
meets the requirements that there is a reasonable relation 
to health, safety and aesthetic objectives and there is no 
costly burden or limitation on satellite receive-only 
antenna users. 
POINT II. 
PALMER'S REMAINING ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL DO NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR 
REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Palmer has asserted numerous issues on appeal, for 
clarity, these issues can be grouped as follows: 
Issues 3-11, 29, 30, 45-51, 55-62, 69, 70, 73-78, 80-
93, 95, 97-143, 146-148 generally discuss the legitimacy of 
4 
United States currency. These issues are meritless or were 
not presented in the trial of this matter. Issues not 
raised or litigated at the trial level cannot be submitted 
on appeal. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986). 
Therefore, these issues should be dismissed. 
4 
These include such bizzare issues as: the trial court 
lacking jurisdiction because judges are not compensated in 
gold or silver; defendant's fine not being valid because 
tender was in currency rather than gold or silver. 
Issues 12-28, 31-35, 39, 40, 144 and 84, 150 
collectively assert defendant's argument made at trial that 
by placing a light on defendant's satellite dish, it became 
a light pole. Defendant also argued the satellite dish was 
an ornamental feature. 
These issues are factual issues presented to the jury 
by the defendant and which the jury found against the 
defendant. The standard of review from a jury trial is 
5 
narrow, an appellate court will not substitute its judgment 
for that of the jury. The evidence is reviewed in the 
7 light most favorable to the jury verdict. So long as there 
is some evidence including reasonable inferences from which 
findings of all requisite elements of the crime can 
Q 
reasonably be made, the appellate inquiry stops. In the 
present case, there was no credible evidence presented to 
prove defendant's claim that a satellite dish became a light 
pole simply by placing a light on it or, that it was an 
ornamental feature. Rather, the evidence presented by the 
City indicated that placing a light on the satellite dish 
and calling it a light pole was pretextural (R. 84). 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
Id. at 447. 
Defendant also argues that there was selective 
enforcement of the City Codes and he was thereby subjected 
to discrimination. The City enforcement officer testified 
that he had enforced other violations that the defendant had 
brought to his attention in the same neighborhood, including 
requiring one homeowner to remove a refrigerator from the 
front of his house and requiring absentee property owners to 
clean up a vacant lot (R. 81-82). Therefore, there was no 
selective enforcement as the defendant claimed. These 
issues must fail on their merits. 
In Issues 8, 63-68 and 96, Palmer argues that his 
satellite dish antenna is a nonconforming use or that Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 was an ex post facto law. To 
qualify as nonconforming use, defendant must have used his 
property in a nonconforming way prior to the date the 
g 
ordinance came into effect making it nonconforming. In 
this case, Salt Lake City Ordinance No. 51-5-7 regulating 
structures in the front yard of a property was passed in 
1983. Defendant testified that he had placed the 
21.04.335 Nonconforming use. 
"Nonconforming use" means a use which lawfully occupied a 
building or land at the time the ordinance codified in this 
title became effective, and which does not conform with the 
use regulations of the zone in which it is located. (Prior 
code §51-2-39) 
See full text attached as Appendix A. 
satellite dish in his yard in 1985 (R. 111). Therefore, 
there is no nonconforming use. 
Likewise, for Salt Lake City Ordinance 51-5-7 to have 
been an ex post facto law it must have been passed after the 
defendant had placed his satellite antenna in the front 
yard. It was not. 
Issues 71, 72, 79 and 149 raise the issue of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant alleges that 
counsel failed to argue federal preemption and failed to 
introduce photographs of other satellite dishes located in 
Salt Lake City to prove defendant's selective enforcement 
argument. The record, however, indicates that both of these 
points were argued to the court by counsel. Counsel 
introduced evidence of other satellite dishes (R. 61, 62) 
and attempted to argue the issue of federal preemption to 
the court (R. 90). The Utah Supreme Court has set forth the 
standards that must be met to establish a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must 
first show that "specific identified acts or omissions fall 
outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance" and second, that he was prejudiced as a result 
of the alleged deficiencies, i.e., the defendant must 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986). These 
standards have been adopted by this Court in State v. 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1987). 
"affirmatively show that a reasonable probability exists 
that but for counsel's error, the result would have been 
different. 
Defendant's alleged omissions did not occur and 
therefore do not constitute the required showing. These 
issues should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake City Ordinance §51-5-7 is not preempted by 
FCC regulation. It equally regulates all types of antennas. 
The ordinance does not discriminate among antennas and does 
not create unreasonable limitations on satellite users. 
Therefore, federal preemption is unwarranted. The remainder 
of Palmer's issues are oblivious to the record and do not 
merit consideration by this Court. The jury verdict finding 
the defendant guilty should be sustained by this Court. 
DATED this day of , 1989. 
RICHARD G. HAMP 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to Bruce P. Palmer, pro se, 
933 Pennsylvania Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, by 
depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this 
day of , 1989. 
APPENDIX A 
Sec. 51-5-7. Front yard exceptions. The area of a 
required front yard shall be open and unobstructed except 
for the following which are permitted: 
(1) Fences, walls, or other similar structures as 
provided elsewhere by this chapter. 
(2) Uncovered steps leading to the main building; 
provided, however, that they are not more than four feet in 
height and do not cause any danger or hazard to traffic by 
obstructing the view of the street or intersection. Any 
portion of any steps, covered or uncovered, that are more 
than four feet above grade must be back of the required 
setback line. 
(3) Eaves or cornices projecting not more than two 
feet. 
(4) A driveway leading to a properly located garage or 
parking area; provided, however, no portion of a front yard 
as required in this ordinance, except for these approved 
driveways, shall be hard-surfaced or graveled so as to 
encourage or make possible the parking of automobiles, nor 
shall the city allow any curb cuts or approve any driveways 
except for entrance and exit driveways leading to properly 
located parking areas. 
(5) Circular driveways shall be permitted in required 
front yard areas of single family dwellings leading to and 
from a properly located garage or carport on the property 
subject to the following conditions: 
(a) All such drives shall be of concrete 
construction. 
(b) Such drives shall not be over twelve (12) 
feet in width. 
(c) There shall be an area in landscaping at 
least fifteen (15) feet in depth from the front property 
line to the farthest edge of the drive. 
(d) Driveway areas are not to be used for the 
parking or storage of any trailer, boat or other equipment 
at any time, nor is the area to be used for overnight or 
permanent parking of any vehicle. 
(e) Passenger automobiles may be parked on 
driveways serving private residences, provided the -, 
automobile is parked completely on private property. 
12 ^ ^ 
This ^s the text of the ordinance from 1983 to May 1, 
1988 when it was recodified/with minor changes to Section 
21.80.090 Salt Lake City Ordinances. ' 
